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Abstract
This paper studies the costs and bene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when foreign lobbying can help internalize cross national externalities. We argue
that this is an often overlooked bene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lobby groups and domestic unorganized groups coincide or not. We illustrate the
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1 Introduction
Legal restrictions on lobbying by foreign lobby groups are common. For example, in the
United States, the 1974 amendment to the Federal Election Campaign Act prohibits
contributions by foreign nationals to Federal, state, or local elections. Although many
loopholes exist, the intention is clearly to curtain the inuence of foreign special inter-
ests. IDEA (2011) lists 41 other countries with bans or other forms of restrictions on
foreign donations to political parties. This includes the United Kingdom, France, Brazil,
Canada, and Argentina. Examples of countries which do not impose such bans include
Australia, Columbia and Denmark.
The concern that advocates of restrictions on foreign lobbying often express is that
foreign lobbying subverts the goals of democracy and undermine the legitimacy of gov-
ernment (Savrin 1988; Powell 1996). The counter-argument proposed in this paper is
that foreign interests often have a legitimate stake in domestic policy making. This is
because policy choices made by one country a¤ect the welfare of citizens and rms of
other countries. Examples of this include environmental policy, trade policy, and regu-
lation of labor standards as well as scal and monetary policy. A potential benet of
allowing foreign lobbying is that it can help internalize such cross national externalities.
This argument in favor of foreign lobbying is, we believe, important, and as shown, for
example, by Gawande, Krishna, and Robbins (2006), Kee, Olarreaga, and Silva (2007)
and Gawande, Maloney, and Rojas (2009), of empirical relevance.
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. The rst objective is to give the externality
argument in favor of foreign lobbying a proper welfare-theoretical underpinning and to
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explore its limitations. To this end, we build on work by Grossman and Helpman (1995),
Prat and Rustichini (2003), Damania and Fredriksson (2007), Fredriksson and Millimet
(2007) and Aidt and Hwang (2008) on common agency models with many principals
and many agents. We show that foreign lobbying can maximize world social welfare if
all interest groups in all countries are organized in lobby groups and all governments are
equally receptive to campaign contributions or bribes. Neither of these ideal conditions
are satised in practice. Olson (1965) has taught us why many social groups are unable
to overcome the collective action problem and therefore remain unorganized.1 A large
body of empirical research into the causes and consequences of corruption demonstrates
large cross national di¤erences in the cost of buying inuence on government policy. This
weakens the externality argument in favor of foreign lobbying, but does not eliminate it.
As long as cross-national externalities are left uninternalized in the presence of bans on
foreign lobbying and corruption di¤erences are not too large, lifting such bans increases
world social welfare also under more realistic conditions.
The second objective of the paper is, in the tradition of Brannan and Buchanan
(1980), to study the costs and benets of constitutional rules aimed at regulating foreign
lobbying. This brings to the forefront the trade o¤ between internalization of cross
national externalities and loss of democratic legitimacy. We focus the analysis on trade
protection and regulation of environmental externalities and ask in each case whether
it is in the national interest to ban foreign lobbying. It transpires that the degree of
interest alignment between unorganized social groups within a country and foreign lobby
groups is an important factor. In the presence of such alignment, it is, typically, not
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in the national interest to ban foreign lobbying. The reason is that foreign lobbying
corrects a pre-existing bias in domestic policy making against domestic unorganized
groups. In the absence of such alignment, a ban on foreign lobbying may or may not
be in the national interest. In this case, the constitutional choice involves a trade o¤
between the benets of internalizing cross national externalities and exacerbating the
pre-existing distortion of domestic policy choices. Another insight that ows from the
analysis is that it may be in the interest of a country to open up for foreign lobbying
even if policy choices in other countries are of no consequence to social groups in that
country.
Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4
compares equilibrium outcomes with and without a ban on foreign lobbying. Section 5
analyzes the merits of a constitutional ban on foreign lobbying. Section 6, concludes.
2 Related literature
Our focus is on the relationship between foreign lobbying and policy externalities. For-
eign lobbying also plays a leading role in the theories developed by Gawande, Krishna,
and Robbins (2006) and Kee, Olarreaga, and Silva (2007). They study how foreign rms,
through active lobbying of the government of another country, can reduce import tari¤s
for their own industry or buy preferential market access abroad. Our analysis of foreign
lobbying is more general in two regards. First, it recognizes that lobby groups, typically,
operate in many di¤erent countries at the same time and not just in one. Second, it
takes into account that foreign agents often are a¤ected by policy actions implemented
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in other countries even if they are not directly engaged in economic activities in those
countries. Lobbying also plays a key role in internalizing cross national externalities in
Conconi (2003) and Aidt and Hwang (2008). However, the emphasis in these papers
is on international cooperation between lobby groups in di¤erent countries and not on
foreign lobbying as such. As a consequence, both are silent on the important question
of constitutional rules to restrict foreign lobbying.
In a related paper, Antràs and Padró i Miquel (2011) stress, as we do here, that
foreign inuence can be welfare enhancing by internalizing cross national policy exter-
nalities. They, however, focus on electoral politics and assume that incumbent politicians
in a foreign country can take a costly action that a¤ects the election outcome in another
country. In contrast, we focus on lobbying by foreign special interest groups and are
interested in the question of bans on such activities. Long and Stahler (2009) study the
consequences of allowing foreign rms to enter a rent-seeking contest in which govern-
ment procurement contracts are allocated. They argue that a benet of foreign lobbying
is that it reduces wasteful domestic rent seeking. Our analysis is fundamentally di¤erent
from this. We stress the role of cross national externalities and show that in the absence
of such externalities, foreign lobbying is inconsequential for policy outcomes. Thirdly,
Aidt and Albornoz (2011), Bonfatti (2011), and Albornoz, Galiani, and Heymann (2012)
study the incentive of a foreign government to seek inuence on the political regime of
another country. In contrast, we study the inuence of special interests on the policy
actions taken by a foreign government within a given political regime.
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3 The model
We consider a world populated by social groups and policy makers. The set of social
groups is M with m 2 M and the set of policy makers is N with n 2 N . Both sets are
nite and discrete and have cardinality jM j and jN j, respectively. Policy maker n takes
a single policy action xn 2 R. The payo¤ function of social groupm is ym+um(x), where
ym is money and um(x) is a di¤erentiable, strictly concave and single peaked function
of the policy actions taken by all the policy makers, i.e., x = (xn)n2N .
A social group is either organized as a lobby group or unorganized. The set of lobby
groups is MO and the set of unorganized social groups is MU with MO [MU = M .
The cardinality of MU and MO are
MU  and MO, respectively. The lobby groups
o¤er campaign contributions to the policy makers to inuence their policy actions, but
may face restrictions on whom they are allowed to o¤er these contributions to. Unor-
ganized groups cannot, by assumption, o¤er contributions to any policy maker. The
contribution schedule o¤ered to policy maker n by group m is Cnm(xn;x n). The con-
tribution schedules are di¤erentiable and specify a particular payment to be made to
policy maker n if he takes policy action xn. The payment o¤ered to a particular policy
maker for action xn may indirectly depend on the policy actions taken by the other pol-
icy makers, x n = (xk)k2N;k 6=n. This interdependency arises naturally in many contexts.
Suppose, for instance, that the policy actions are environmental taxes implemented in
di¤erent jurisdictions and marginal environmental damage is a function of all taxes.
Then, the marginal value to an environmental lobby group of an increase in the tax in
one jurisdiction depends on the taxes implemented in the others.
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Policy maker n cares about the contributions that he collects from the lobby groups
and about the welfare of all the social groups located within his jurisdiction (see below).
We denote the later by Wn(x) and let n  0 be the weight attached by policy maker
n to social welfare relative to contributions. As in Fredriksson and Svensson (2003),
we interpret n as an inverse measure of corruption in jurisdiction n. The relationship
between the policy makers and the lobby groups is modelled as an agency game. The
game has two stages. In the rst stage, given the constitutional constraints on the
types of contributions that are allowed, each lobby group o¤ers contribution schedules
to the policy makers taking the schedules o¤ered by the other lobby groups as given.
In the second stage, each policy maker implements the policy action that maximizes its
objective function taking as given the policy actions of the other policy makers.
To focus on the question of foreign lobbying, we let each policy maker represents a
national government and partition the set of social groups into jN j disjoint sets, with
M = [n2NMn. The set Mn is the set of social groups located in country n. This set
is further partitioned into organized and unorganized groups where Mn = MOn [MUn .
Each country has at least one lobby group. The social welfare function of country n is
Wn(x) =
X
m2Mn
um(x) + Yn; (1)
where Yn is national income in country n. Since the payo¤ of each social group depends
on the entire vector of policy actions, the policy action taken by any given government
potentially a¤ects the welfare of all groups in all countries. Consequently, the policy
actions produce cross national externalities.
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4 To ban or not to ban
The benchmark for our analysis is the policy vector that maximizes global social welfare
(GSW). This is dened as the sum of the welfare of all social groups, whether organized
or not, in all countries:
(xn)n2N = arg max
(xn)n2N
P
n2N
P
m2Mn u
m(x): (2)
The outcome in political equilibrium may di¤er from this for two reasons. Firstly,
lobbying may distort the policy vector in favor of the organized groups. Secondly, the
individual policy makers may fail to internalize the global impact of their policy actions.
We compare two scenarios: one with a ban on foreign lobbying and one without.
4.1 Ban on foreign lobbying
In this scenario, the national lobby groups can o¤er contribution schedules only to their
own government. Formally, if m =2 MOn , then Cnm(xn;x n)  0. The game between
the national lobby groups and their government is a common agency game. Using the
equilibrium characterization provided for this case by Grossman and Helpman (1995),
we can state (without proof) the following result.2
Proposition 1 (Ban on foreign lobbying). The equilibrium policy vector is (exn)n2N
where
exn = argmax
xn
n
P
m2Mn
um(xn; ex n) + P
m2MOn
um(xn; ex n) for all n 2 N: (3)
If @u
m
@xn
6= 0 for some m =2Mn and/or MUn 6= ;, then (exn)n2N 6= fxngn2N .
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With a ban on foreign lobbying, each policy action is chosen in isolation. It maximizes
the sum of the payo¤of the government responsible for the action and the national lobby
groups, taking as given the policy actions of the other governments. As a consequence,
the cross national externalities are not internalized. On top of this, unless all social
groups in the country are organized, the policy action is biased in favor of the organized
social groups. The equilibrium policy outcome is, in general, ine¢ cient from a global
point of view.
4.2 No ban on foreign lobbying
In this scenario, the lobby groups can o¤er contributions to all governments. Formally,
the game between the governments and the lobby groups becomes a multiple principal,
multiple agent game. Prat and Rustichini (1999, 2003) provide an equilibrium charac-
terization that we adopt. As mentioned above, the contribution schedule o¤ered to a
particular government may depend indirectly on the policy actions taken by other gov-
ernments. This complicates the equilibrium characterization. Suppose, however, that
each government only observes the contribution schedules o¤ered to itself and that its
beliefs about the contribution schedules o¤ered to the other governments do not depend
on the o¤ers it receives itself. Under these two assumptions, Prat and Rustichini (1999,
Theorem 8) show that the following equilibrium characterization applies.
Lemma 1 A pair (( bCnm)n2N;m2M ; bx), consisting of a vector of feasible non-negative con-
tribution schedules and a vector of policy actions, constitutes a pure strategy equilibrium
outcome of the agency game without bans on foreign lobbying if and only if the following
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three conditions hold:
(AM) For all n 2 N and xn 2 R,
bxn = argmax
xn
nWn(xn; bx n) +Pm2MO bCnm(xn; bx n) (4)
(IC) For every m 2MO and x 2 RjN j
bx = argmax
x
um (xn; x n) + (5)P
n2N
h
nWn(xn; x n) +
P
j2MO;j 6=m bCnj (xn;x n)i
(CM) For every m 2MO and n 2 N
nWn(bxn; bx n) +Pm2MO bCnm(bxn; bx n) (6)
= max
xn
nWn(xn; bx n) +Pj2MO;j 6=m bCnj (xn; bx n)
The rst condition, agent maximization (AM), requires that each government selects
the optimal policy action given the contribution schedules o¤ered to it and given the
equilibrium actions of the other governments. The second condition, incentive compati-
bility (IC), requires that a lobby group m cannot nd contribution schedules that yield
higher payo¤s than its equilibrium schedules given the equilibrium contribution sched-
ules of the other lobby groups. An implication of this is that the vector of equilibrium
policy actions must maximize the joint surplus of each lobby group and the collective of
all governments. The third condition is a cost minimization condition (CM). It requires
that the equilibrium contribution schedules are such that no lobby group can get the
equilibrium policy vector implemented at lower cost.
10
Condition (IC) implies that bx must satisfy
@um(bx)
@xn
+
X
k2N
k
@Wk(bx)
@xn
+
X
j2MO;j 6=m
@ bCnj (bxn; bx n)
@xn
+
X
k2N;k 6=n
X
j2MO;j 6=m
@ bCkj (bxk; bx k)
@xn
= 0 (7)
for all m 2MO and n 2 N . Adding these conditions up over m 2MO, we get
X
m2MO
@um(bx)
@xn
+
 MO  1 X
j2MO
@ bCnj (bxn; bx n)
@xn
(8)
+
 MO  1 X
k2N;k 6=n
X
j2MO
@ bCkj (bxk; bx k)
@xn
+
MOX
k2N
k
@Wk(bx)
@xn
= 0
for all n 2 N . Since maxxn
P
j2MO;j 6=m bCnj (xn; bx n) + nWn(xn; bx n) is a constant,
condition (CM) implies that
k
@Wk(bx)
@xn
+
X
m2MO
@ bCkm(xk; bx k)
@xn
= 0 for all k 2 N: (9)
Given that, equation (8) reduces, as shown in Appendix A.1., to
X
m2MO
@um(bx)
@xn
+
X
k2N
k
@Wk(bx)
@xn
= 0 for all n 2 N , (10)
We observe that the equilibrium policy choice in country n, xn, is governed by two
considerations. Firstly, all organized groups, whether foreign or domestic, get extra
weight in the calculus according to the marginal externality the policy choice imposes
on them. This is intuitive and reects the fact that they can lobbying the government in
country n. Secondly, the marginal impact on social welfare, not only in country n, but in
all countries get reected in the choice of xn. This, in particular, means that the welfare
e¤ect on unorganized groups in other countries than country n is taken into account.
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This is surprising at rst since these groups do not, by assumption, o¤er contributions
to any government. The reason their welfare nevertheless gets counted is that the lobby
groups must compensate the governments from which they seek concessions for the
(marginal) loss in social welfare associated with giving it. This size of the compensation
depends partly on the welfare cost imposed on unorganized groups. This, in turn,
depends on the policy choices made elsewhere. Accordingly, by making sure that policy
choices are more to the likening of unorganized groups everywhere, the lobby groups
can, as also emphasized in Aidt (2010), at the margin lower the pricethey have to pay
for a given change in policy in a particular country. Using equation (10), we can state
the rst main result of the paper.
Proposition 2 (Globally Optimal Foreign Lobbying) Suppose that all social groups are
organized, i.e., MU = ;, and that all governments are equally corrupt, i.e., n =  > 0
for all n. The equilibrium policy vector with foreign lobbying, (bxn)n2N , internalizes all
cross national externalities and is equal to the policy vector that maximizes global social
welfare, i.e., (bxn)n2N = fxngn2N .
Proof. MU = ; implies that we can write equation (10) as
X
k2N
k
@Wk(bx)
@xn
+
X
m2M
@um(bx)
@xn
= 0 for all n 2 N: (11)
Expanding this equation, we get
X
k2N
(1 + k)
X
m2Mk
@um(bx)
@xn
= 0 for all n 2 N; (12)
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where Mk represents the set of social groups located in country k. For k =  for all k,
this reduces to
(1 + )
X
m2M
@um(bx)
@xn
= 0 for all n 2 N: (13)
This is the necessary condition for maximization of global social welfare as dened by
equation (2)
The proposition shows that foreign lobbying can serve a socially useful purpose: it
can internalize all cross national externalities. Foreign lobbying allows each government
to accept contributions from foreign as well as from domestic lobby groups. Foreign
lobby groups only have an incentive to o¤er these contributions if they have a stake in
the policy action. In e¤ect, they reward the governments for taking into account the
e¤ect of their policy actions on the welfare of the foreign special interests they represent.
Two conditions must be satised for all cross national externalities to be internalized in
this way. Firstly, all social groups must be organized. This allows all a¤ected parties to
lobby in all countries. This requirement is intuitive and accords with other well-known
results from the lobbying literature, e.g., Grossman and Helpman (1994; 1995). Secondly
and more surprisingly, even if all groups were organized, the equilibrium policy vector
does not maximize global social welfare unless all governments are equally corrupt. To
see the intuition, suppose that one government values contributions from lobby groups
more than another. This makes it cheaper for the lobby groups to seek inuence on the
former than on the latter. This distorts the policy outcome away from the global social
optimum. This e¤ect is new to the lobbying literature.
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Proposition 2 gives ideal conditions under which internalization is complete. We
stress, however, that foreign lobbying continues to internalize externalitiesalbeit imperfectly
in more realistic circumstances and that is a plus from a global social welfare point of
view. On the debit side, we, however, need to count the fact that lifting a ban on foreign
lobbying may produce new or magnify pre-existing distortions. The requirement that all
governments are equally corrupt ensures that this does not happen. In reality, however,
there exists large cross national di¤erences in corruption (Gawande, Krishna, and Olar-
reaga, 2012; Paldam, 2002). This a¤ects the global social value of foreign lobbying. In
fact, it may make a ban optimal from a global point of view. To see this, suppose that
all social groups are organized, that um is additive separable, and that all governments
but that of country 1 are equally corrupt (1 > n = 1 for n > 1). The equilibrium
policy vector with foreign lobbying (which solves equation (10)) is a function of 1 and
the associated global social welfare is GSW ((bxn(1))n2N). This level of welfare is below
the maximum because (xn)n2N 6= (bxn(1))n2N . In Appendix A.2., we show that global
social welfare evaluated at bxn(1))n2N decreases monotonically as corruption levels move
apart. Under a ban on foreign lobbying, the equilibrium policy vector must satisfy the
necessary conditions associated with equation (3). These are independent of cross na-
tional di¤erences in corruption because no lobby group is allowed to lobby abroad. As
a consequence, global social welfare under a ban is independent of 1. Combining those
observations, we conclude that a ban may, for su¢ ciently large cross national corruption
di¤erences, be optimal from a global point of view. Intuitively, without a ban, foreign
lobby groups explore di¤erences in the cost of buying inuence across countries. The
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resulting policy outcome is biased away from the global optimum and more so, then
bigger the cross national di¤erences in corruption are. Eventually, as corruption levels
drift more and more apart, it may be better from a global social point of view to ban
foreign lobbying and to accept that some externalities that could be internalized are left
uninternalized.
The nal point we want to stress is that in the absence of externalities, foreign
lobbying does not matter at all.
Proposition 3 (Inconsequential Foreign Lobbying) If the policy actions do not create
cross national externalities, i.e., @u
m(bx)
@xn
= 0 for all m =2 Mn, then the policy outcome
with and without a ban on foreign lobbying is the same, i.e., (bxn)n2N = (exn)n2N .
Proof. We can write equation (10) as
n
X
m2Mn
@um(bx)
@xn
+
X
m2MOn
@um(bx)
@xn
= 0 for all n 2 N: (14)
This is the necessary condition governing the choice of xn under a ban
This proposition shows that the rules governing foreign lobbying have no global
welfare consequences in the absence of externalities. The reason is that it is costly to
inuence the policy choices of other countries. Foreign lobby groups will, therefore, not
attempt to do so unless they have a legitimate reason. This, on the one hand, highlights
the fact that the case for foreign lobbying must be based on cross national externalities.
On the other hand, it goes some way in di¤using the concern that foreign lobbying
undermines democratic legitimacy by biasing policy outcomes unduly. If there are no
external e¤ects, lobby groups do not lobby abroad even if they could legally.
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5 Constitutional rules and foreign lobbying
Given that policy makers will be subject to lobbying at the stage where they design
policy, would it be in the national interest to impose constitutional constraints on foreign
lobbying in the same way that it may be socially benecial to put constraints on the
tax instruments available to domestic policy makers (Brannan and Buchanan 1980)? Or
would it be better from a strictly national point of view to allow foreign special interests
to inuence domestic policy choices? The answers to these questions center, as we shall
shown in this section, on the potential trade-o¤ between externality internalization and
undue foreign inuence.
5.1 The set Up
We consider a two-country-two-group version of the general model developed above. We
refer to the two countries as the domestic and the foreign country, indexed by k 2 fd; fg.
Each country is populated by two groups of equal size. One group is organized (index
O) as a lobby group while the other is not (index U). To facilitate the analysis, we let
the welfare functions of the social groups be
uUk =  
1
2
x2k + 
U
k x k (15)
uOk = xk + 
O
k x k; (16)
where  k means not k. The welfare functions capture a conict of interest between
organized and unorganized groups within a country. The organized group in country k
wants xk to be high, while the unorganized group wants it to be low. Moreover, they
are designed to capture alternative congurations of preference alignment between social
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groups in the two countries. This aspect is controlled by the parameters Ok and 
U
k .
These determine how the policy choice abroad a¤ects the welfare of the two domestic
groups. The social welfare function of country k is Wk = uOk + u
U
k . The policy choice
that maximizes national social welfare without regard for the e¤ect it has in the other
country is xk = 1. The weights on social welfare relative to contributions are k  0.
Our focus is on the constitutional choice related to bans on foreign lobbying and
we model this as a two stage game. At the constitutional stage, the two countries
simultaneously impose restrictions on foreign lobbying or not. The objective of each
country is to maximize national social welfare. We consider a menu of three possible
constitutional choices available to each country: no ban, a total ban on all types of
foreign lobbying, and a partial ban. A partial ban means that a country bans the
foreign lobby group from lobbying within its jurisdiction but does not prevent its own
lobby group from lobbying abroad.3 A total ban outlaws all types of foreign lobbying.
At the policy making stage, which follows the constitutional stage, the government of
each country decides on a policy action xk 2 R+ with k 2 fd; fg subject to lobbying
as allowed by the rules laid down at the constitutional stage. To ensure interior policy
choices in R+, we impose the following (su¢ cient) parameter restriction
Ok >  
1 +  k + kUk
1 + k
for all k. (17)
To characterize subgame perfect equilibria, we start by analyzing the four payo¤-relevant
subgames that can follow from the constitutional stage.4 First, if at least one of the
countries introduces a total ban or if both countries introduce a partial ban, then foreign
lobbying is ruled out. In the subsequent subgame, which we call the full ban subgame
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(index FB), lobbying only takes place at the national level. The equilibrium policy
choices are:
xFBk =
1 + k
k
> xk = 1: (18)
The policy choice is biased against the unorganized group in each country and no regard
is given to the e¤ect that the choice has on foreign groups. The corresponding maximized
social welfare is denoted W FBk = Wk
 
xFBk ; x
FB
 k

. We notice that a country can always
obtain this level of welfare by unilaterally imposing a total ban.
Second, if both countries decide not to ban, foreign lobbying can take place freely.
The policy outcomes of the induced subgame, which we call the no ban subgame (index
NB), can be deduced from equation (10) and are:
xNBk = x
FB
k + Ak; (19)
where
Ak =
(1 +  k) O k +  k
U
 k
k
: (20)
The parameter Ak can be positive or negative depending on the direction and strength
of the externality that the policy choice in country k imposes on the two social groups
in country  k. The policy choice in country k may, accordingly, be more or less biased
against the unorganized group than under a full ban. The corresponding maximized
social welfare is denoted WNBk = Wk
 
xNBk ; x
NB
 k

.
Third, if one of the countries introduces a partial ban and the other decides not to
impose any ban, then one of the two possible partial ban subgames is induced. We index
these two subgames by PBk where subscript k refers to the country that introduces the
partial ban. The policy outcomes in subgame PBk are characterized by a combination
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of lemma 1 and proposition 1 (see Appendix A.3.):
xPBk k = x
NB
 k (21)
xPBkk = x
NB
k  
O k
k
: (22)
The policy outcome in the country which welcomes lobbying from abroad corresponds to
that in the no ban subgame. This is because all lobby groups get a say in the choice. In
contrast, in the country that imposes the partial ban, policy is inuenced only by its own
lobby group. This group, however, lobbies abroad and, for this reason, the impact of the
policy choice on social welfare abroad is taken into account. Depending on whether the
externality on the foreign lobby group which is banned from lobbying outside its own
jurisdiction is positive or negative, the policy outcome in the country with the partial
ban is lower or higher than in the no ban subgame. The corresponding maximized social
welfare levels are W PBkk = Wk

xPBkk ; x
NB
 k

and W PBk k = W k

xNB k ; x
PBk
k

.
In the next sub-sections, we characterize equilibrium outcomes of the constitutional
game. To bring the main insights out transparently, we start by considering the choice
between a total ban and no ban, leaving aside the possibility of a partial ban to section
5.3.
5.2 When is a total ban in the national interest?
Restricting the constitutional choice to a choice between a total ban and no ban, a full
ban is a subgame perfect equilibrium if k  W FBk  WNBk > 0 for at least one k. We
can express this di¤erential as
k =  Ak + 1
2
 
xFBk + Ak
2    xFBk 2   Ok + Uk A k: (23)
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The three terms on the right-hand side represent the welfare e¤ects in country k as-
sociated with imposing a total ban (given that country  k does not impose a ban).
We call them the competition e¤ect, the alignment e¤ect, and the internalization e¤ect,
respectively. The competition e¤ect ( Ak) captures the impact on the welfare of the
domestic lobby group when the foreign lobby group enters the domestic political scene.
Depending on whether it is a competitor or an ally, foreign lobbying may harm or benet
the domestic lobby group. The alignment e¤ect (1
2
 
xFBk + Ak
2    xFBk 2) captures
whether the foreign lobby groups policy objective aligns with that of the unorganized
domestic group. If it does, then the foreign lobby group unintentionally represents the
unorganized domestic group in the domestic political calculus. In general, the compe-
tition and alignment e¤ect pull in opposite directions. This is because the lobby group
and the unorganized group within a country have opposite policy preferences. The inter-
nalization e¤ect (   Ok + Uk A k) captures the e¤ect on the welfare of the two social
groups in country k of lobby group ks lobbying activities abroad. If, for example, the
policy choice of country  k a¤ects the two groups in country k in a similar way (say,
Ok < 0; 
U
k < 0), then lobbying by lobby group k abroad helps internalize this e¤ect (by
reducing x k). This makes it less likely that country k imposes a ban.
To gain a better understanding of the interplay amongst these three e¤ects, we
consider three particular scenarios. They are selected to bring out a number of salient
points but they also score high on their real world relevance and are:
[T] Trade protection. Let xk  0 represent the tari¤ equivalent of a quota (Facchini,
Willmann, and van Biesebroeck 2006). The unorganized groups are consumers
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who benet from free trade at home and abroad, so Uk = 
U < 0 for k 2 fd; fg.
The lobby groups represent producer interests. They want trade protection at
home but free trade abroad, so Ok = 
O < 0 for k 2 fd; fg.
[RE] Regulation of a reciprocal environmental externality. Let xk  0 represent allowed
emission of a polluting substance, e.g., implied by a design standard that commodi-
ties sold in country k must satisfy. Unorganized citizens are harmed by pollution
irrespective of the source, so Uk = 
U < 0 for k 2 fd; fg. The lobby groups
represent polluter interests. They want regulation to be lax in both countries in
order to keep compliance costs down, so Ok = 
O > 0 for k 2 fd; fg.
[UE] Regulation of an unidirectional environmental externality. Let xk  0 represent
a cap on emission of a polluting substance deposited in a river from sources in
country k. Country d is located downstream from country f along the river. Un-
organized citizens in country d are harmed by pollution irrespective of the source,
so Ud < 0, while unorganized citizens in country f are only a¤ected (negatively)
by emissions from sources located in country f (Uf = 0). The lobby groups repre-
sent polluter interests. The lobby group in country f is not a¤ected by the policy
choice in country d (Of = 0). The lobby group in country d is negatively a¤ected
by pollution from country f because, say, total pollution in the river pushes up
the compliance costs associated with domestic regulation, so Od < 0.
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5.2.1 On the role of the competition, the alignment, and the internalization
e¤ect
The key di¤erence between scenario [T] and [RE] is the degree of alignment between
the objective of the foreign lobby group and unorganized domestic citizens. In the
trade protection scenario [T], these objectives are aligned. This happens if, for exam-
ple, foreign lobbying is targeted at reducing trade barriers (Husted 1991; Gawande,
Krishna and Robbins 2006) or at gaining preferential market access (Kee, Olarreaga,
and Silva 2007). Of course, such alignment is not a guarantee (Hillman and Ursprung
1988). Yet, trade policy is a good example of a case where foreign lobby groups and
unorganized domestic consumers are likely to nd themselves on the same side of the is-
sue. In the environmental externality scenario [RE], the situation is reversed. Lobbying
against environmental protection by a well-organized foreign industry lobby group often
has detrimental environmental e¤ects for citizens in the country that hosts the foreign
lobby group. Consequently, environmental regulation is a good example of a case where
foreign (producer) lobby groups and unorganized domestic consumers nd themselves
on opposite sides of the issue. The next proposition compares the equilibrium outcome
under scenario [T] and scenario [RE].
Proposition 4 Suppose that d = f =  > 1 and that assumption (17) is satised.
Dened O =  
U
1+
> 0 and O = 2 
U
 1 > 
O.
1. In scenario [T], no ban is the unique constitutional choice in both countries.
2. In scenario [RE], a total ban is the unique constitutional choice in both countries
if O 2 O; O while no ban is the unique constitutional choice if either O 2
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 
0; O

or O > O. Moreover, an increase in corruption (a reduction in ) makes
a total ban more likely.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
The proposition highlights two important points. Firstly, in scenario [T], where the
policy objectives of the foreign lobby group and domestic unorganized consumers are
aligned, a ban is never in the national interest of a country. In contrast, in scenario [RE],
where the opposite is (typically) true, a total ban may be imposed. This illustrates the
importance of the alignment e¤ect: a total ban is more likely to be in the national interest
of a country if foreign lobbying magnies the pre-existing bias against unorganized
domestic groups. We can interpret cases where this happens as examples of loss of
democratic legitimacy. Secondly, in scenario [RE], the level of corruption in the two
countries a¤ects the likelihood of a constitutional ban. The higher corruption is the
cheaper it is for the foreign lobby group to buy inuence and the more likely it is that
a ban is introduced at the constitutional stage.
To gain a deeper understanding of the logic behind proposition 4, recall the three
general e¤ects at play: the competition, the alignment, and the internalization e¤ect. In
scenario [T], foreign lobbying allows the domestic producer group to lobby for trade liber-
alization abroad. This internalizes the beggar-thy-neighbour externality to the benet of
both the organized and unorganized group at home. The direction of the internalization
e¤ect is, therefore, unambiguously in favor of foreign lobbying. At the same time, for-
eign lobbying reduces the anti-consumer bias in trade policy byunintentionallygiving
unorganized consumers voice in the domestic political calculus. This is the alignment
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e¤ect. It also pulls away from a ban. The only downsideof the no ban rule is that
domestic producers view the entry of the foreign producer lobby group as unwelcome
competition. Accordingly, the competition e¤ect pulls towards a ban. The net result,
however, is that both countries support foreign lobbying because it brings equilibrium
trade regulation closer to the respective national social optimum.
In scenario [RE], the situation is more complex. This is because the objectives of
the foreign polluter lobby group and domestic unorganized consumers may no longer
be aligned. This changes the national welfare calculus at the constitutional stage in
fundamental ways and opens up the possibility that a ban on all foreign lobbying may
be in the national interest. The equilibrium choice is no ban when the cross national
externality, as seen from the point of view of the two lobby groups, is either weak
(O 2  0; O) or strong (O > O). Between these extremes, the equilibrium choice
is a total ban. To understand why, table 1 is useful. It records, for four regions of O,
the direction of the policy change induced by a ban (relative to the no ban subgame),
the direction (pro- or anti-ban) in which the competition, alignment, and internalization
e¤ect pull, and the equilibrium choice of the two countries. In region 1 (O 2  0; O),
the domestic producer lobby group is relatively una¤ected by the emission cap imposed
abroad (O is low). Paradoxically, foreign lobbying actually lead to tighter regulation in
this case. This is because tighter regulation abroad lowers the price the producer lobby
group pays for laxer regulation at home. This implies that the alignment e¤ect pulls
away from the ban. This is reinforced by the internalization e¤ect. It also pulls away
from a ban because, for low O what matters from a social point of view is the e¤ect of
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the externality on consumers and they like the tighter cap induced by foreign lobbying.
Only the competition e¤ect pulls towards a ban, but it is dominated by the other two
e¤ects in this region. In region 2 (O 2 [O; U ]), the producer lobby groups, if they are
allowed to, lobby the foreign government for a laxer cap. This switches the competition
and alignment e¤ect around. Since consumers care more about the externality than
producers in this region, the internalization e¤ect pulls towards a ban. The net e¤ect is
that a total ban is the equilibrium outcome. In regions 3 and 4 (O 2 ( U ;1)), the
policy externality becomes a serious concern for the producer lobby groups relative to
the unorganized consumers. Since a ban continues to tighten the cap in both countries,
the internalization e¤ect switches back to pulling away from a ban. This e¤ect becomes
stronger as the externality becomes stronger. At rst, in region 3 (O 2 ( U ; O]) the
e¤ect is not yet strong enough to change the fact that a ban is in the national interest.
Eventually when O exceeds O in region 4, the externality e¤ect becomes so strong
that it overturns the alignment e¤ect and the equilibrium constitutional choice switches
back to no ban.
5.2.2 On the role of asymmetric externalities
Scenario [UE]regulation of an unidirectional environmental externalityis designed to
illustrate the e¤ect of asymmetric externalities. The equilibrium emission cap in the
downstream country d is xNBd = x
FB
d =
1+d
d
whether or not a total ban is in place. This
is because the polluter lobby group in country f has no reason to lobby government d
since it is una¤ected by emissions downstream (Of = 
U
f = 0) The downstream lobby
group, however, has an incentive to lobby upstream (Od = 
U
d  d < 0). In the absence
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TABLE 1
Overview of the three e¤ects
Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4
O 2  0; O O; U ( U ; O] (O;1)
Emission reduced by ban No (A < 0) Yes (A  0) Yes (A  0) Yes (A  0)
Competition e¤ect Pro-ban Anti-ban Anti-ban Anti-ban
Alignment e¤ect Anti-ban Pro-ban Pro-ban Pro-ban
Internalization e¤ect Anti-ban Pro-ban Anti-ban Anti-ban
Constitutional choice No ban Total ban Total ban No ban
of a ban, the equilibrium cap in country f is xNBf =
1+f
f
+ Af . This is lower than the
emission cap under a ban (xFBf =
1+f
f
) since
Af =
(1 + 2d) d
f
< 0: (24)
The welfare di¤erential with and without a ban for each country is
d =  
 
Od + 
U
d

Af =  2dAf < 0 (25)
f = Af

Aff + 2
2f

: (26)
The downstream country d is unambiguously in favor of foreign lobbying. Since the
upstream polluter lobby group has no interest in lobbying downstream, the only con-
sideration is the internalization e¤ect. With consensus amongst all social groups in
country d that emissions in country f are too high, social welfare in country d increases
if the downstream lobby group can buy inuence on the policy choice upstream. The
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situation in the upstream country f is more complex. This is because the competition
and alignment e¤ects pull in opposite directions. On the one hand, the polluter lobby
group is harmed by the lobbying activities of the downstream lobby group. On the other
hand, the unorganized group in country f benets from the induced reduction in the
pro-polluter bias in the emission cap.
Proposition 5 If d <
 2
1+2d
, then the constitutional choice of country f is to ban
foreign lobbying. If d 2
h
 2
1+2d
; 0
i
, then the constitutional choice of both countries is to
allow foreign lobbying.
Proof. It is a weakly dominant strategy for country d to allow foreign lobbying. The
best response of country f is to introduce a ban if f > 0, d <  21+2d and not to ban
otherwise
It is not a surprise that foreign lobbying is in the interest of a downstream country.
It is, however, surprising that an upstream country whose citizens are not themselves
exposed to policy externalities from abroad may nd it in its best interest to agree to
foreign lobbying. The reason is that the equilibrium cap on emissions from upstream
producers is stricter with foreign lobbying than with a ban. This may be socially ben-
ecial for the upstream country because, without foreign lobbying, the emission cap is
laxer than what is socially optimal from that countrys point of view. For a relatively
weak externality, foreign lobbying helps correct this pre-existing distortion. In contrast,
for su¢ ciently strong externalities foreign lobbying magnies the pre-existing distortion
and a ban serves the national interest of the upstream country.
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5.3 When is a partial ban in the national interest?
Above we framed the constitutional choice as an either-or choice between a total ban
on all types of foreign lobbying or no restrictions at all. In between these extremes,
however, there is the possibility of a partial ban whereby a country bans foreign lobby
groups from lobbying within its jurisdiction, while not actively preventing its own lobby
groups from seeking inuence abroad. This situation is, in fact, not uncommon in
practice. Many countries that do not allow foreign lobby groups to pay otherwise legal
contributions to political parties within their jurisdiction often do not prevent their own
special interests from paying such contributions abroad and may even encourage such
activities through tax breaks for the associated expenses. In recent years, however,
many countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, have introduced
legislation that makes it illegal for companies listed within their jurisdiction to pay
bribes to foreign government o¢ cials. This can be viewed as a move from a partial ban
to a total ban on a particular form of foreign lobbying.
Motivated by these examples, we expand the analysis and let the choice set at the
constitutional stage include a partial ban. We are interested in the conditions under
which one of the partial ban subgames is played. We return to scenario [T] from section
5.2 with the added assumption that the two governments are equally corrupt f = d =
. This a useful starting point because in this scenario, a full ban is never an equilibrium
(proposition 4), but it is possible that a partial ban is. Since the two countries are
identical, it is clear that the conditions under which subgame PBd and PBf are played
must be the same. This opens up for the possibility of multiple equilibria as well as the
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possibility that otherwise identical countries select a di¤erent constitutional rule.
If country k adopts a partial ban, then country  k can induce subgame PBk by
adopting the no ban rule, while a partial or full ban both induce subgame FB without
any foreign lobbying. Conversely, if country  k adopts a no ban rule, then country
k can induce subgame PBk by enforcing a partial ban; it can induce subgame FB by
introducing a total ban; or it can induce subgame NB with no restrictions on foreign
lobbying by choosing to adopt a no ban rule. Accordingly, subgame PBk is played if
country  k adopts the no ban rule, i.e., if
W PBk k > W
FB
 k (27)
and country k adopts a partial ban, i.e., if
W PBkk > maxfWNBk ;W FBk g. (28)
In the trade policy scenario, country  k is better o¤by allowing the foreign lobby group
to inuence its policy choice than impose a total ban even if this is not reciprocated
by country k. The reason is that the foreign lobby group reduces the bias against the
unorganized group in country  k and this generates a su¢ ciently large social benet
for the country. Accordingly, condition (27) is always satised (see Appendix A.5.).
Moreover, according to proposition 4 country k prefers no ban to a full ban, i.e.,WNBk >
W FBk . Hence, the critical condition for subgame PBk to be played is W
PBk
k > W
NB
k .
Using the policy choices for the two subgames derived previously, we nd that
W PBkk  WNBk =
  
O + U


+
 
O + 2

22
!
O: (29)
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Whether this di¤erential is positive or negative depends on the strength of the negative
externality of trade protection (O < 0 and U < 0), and on the level of corruption .
Proposition 6 In scenario [T] with d = f =  > 1, a partial ban on foreign lobbying
in one country and no ban in the other is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome if
O <  2
U + 2
2 + 1
: (30)
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
The proposition shows that a partial ban can be in the national interest of one
country but not the other. It is interesting that such asymmetries can emerge despite
the fact that the countries are identical. Intuitively, the country that does not ban
foreign lobbying prefers that to a total ban. In either case, its own lobby group is
prevented from lobbying abroad but the alignment e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong for it
to prefer letting the foreign lobby group in. The situation is more complex for the
country that introduces the partial ban. Here, the choice is between opening up for
foreign lobbying at home or not to do so; in either case, its own lobby group can freely
lobby abroad. By not imposing a partial ban, the foreign lobby group will lobby for
less protection. This benets the domestic unorganized group but harms the organized
group and induces a trade o¤. If the foreign lobby group is strongly in favor of low trade
protection (O is numerically large), it is in the national interest to impose the partial
ban, but if the policy externality is relatively weak, it is best to lift the ban. We note
that if condition (30) is satised, the constitutional game got multiple equilibria.
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6 Discussion
We present an externality-based argument for legalizing foreign lobbying. Our starting
point is the fact that many public policies, ranging from environmental standards and
trade interventions to macroeconomic demand management policies, have consequences
far beyond the borders of the country that introduces them. This gives agents a legit-
imate stake in public policy abroad. Foreign lobbying is a natural mechanism through
which the interests of foreign stakeholders can be taken into account. It is clear, how-
ever, that lobbyingand foreign lobbying is no exceptionbiases policy choices against
unorganized stakeholders. As a consequence, foreign lobbying, as a vehicle of political
internalization of cross national externalities, only maximizes global social welfare un-
der restrictive assumptions. Yet, even if this ideal is unattainable, we believe that the
externality argument itself in favor of foreign lobbying is su¢ ciently general and has
a su¢ ciently solid welfare-theoretical foundation to make it of practical relevance. It
should, therefore, be part of an informed debate about the role of foreign lobbying and
bans on foreign donations to domestic political campaigns and other forms of foreign
lobbying. A common objection to legalizing foreign lobbying is that doing so undermines
democratic legitimacy. The concern is that foreign lobbying biases policy choices made
by democratically elected governments in unwarranted ways. While lobbying no doubt
biases policy choices, our analysis emphasizes that bans on foreign lobbying are incon-
sequential in the absence of policy externalities. In other words, foreign lobby groups
only seek inuence on policy choices abroad when they really have a stake in the policy
choice and in that case, foreign lobbying will most likely improve global social welfare.
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This goes some way in defusing the main argument against foreign lobbying. It also
demonstrates that the externality-based case for foreign lobbying in not undermined
by the fact that it is di¢ cult, perhaps impossible, to allow lobbying for some policies
and not for others. An unconditional green light for foreign lobbying will, according to
the logic of our analysis, lead to lobbying for and against those policies that generate
cross national externalities and only for and against those policies. Accordingly, there is
no need for policy makers (with global social welfare in mind) to di¤erentiate between
di¤erent policies and to ban lobbying for some but not for others.
Yet, global social welfare may not be what the advocates of a ban have in mind.
Hence, the question as to whether a ban can be in the national interest remains. Our
analysis identies an important building block in answering this question: the degree of
preference alignment between unorganized social groups at home and organized social
groups abroad. When these preferences overlap, as they often do in relation to trade
policies, allowing foreign lobbying is, typically, in the national interest. The reason is
that foreign lobby groups provide voice to unorganized citizens thereby counter-acting
the pre-existing bias in favor of domestic lobby groups. Accordingly, the argument that
foreign lobbying undermines democratic legitimacy is most relevant when the objectives
of foreign lobby groups, as it is often the case with regard to environmental protection,
do not coincide with those of unorganized citizens. In this case, foreign lobbying may
exacerbate the pre-existing bias in favor of domestic lobby groups and a ban may, but
need not, be in the national interest. Seen from this perspective, it is clear that a rst
best (national) solution to the foreign lobbying question could well involve banning for-
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eign lobbying for some policies but not for others. This may be infeasible. Accordingly,
a second best solution would have to judge the relative costs and benets for di¤erent
types of policies and the internalization benets must be quantied and weighted against
any loss in democratic legitimacy and other costs.
Appendix
A.1 . Derivation of equation (8)
The starting point for deriving equation (10) is
X
m2MO
@um(bx)
@xn
+
 MO  1 X
j2MO
@ bCnj (bxn; bx n)
@xn
(31)
+
 MO  1 X
k2N;k 6=n
X
j2MO
@ bCkj (bxk; bx k)
@xn
+
MOX
k2N
k
@Wk(bx)
@xn
= 0:
From condition (CM), we get that
 k @Wk(bx)
@xn
=
X
m2MO
@ bCkm(xk; bx k)
@xn
(32)
for all k 2 N . We can rewrite equation (31) as
X
m2MO
@um(bx)
@xn
   MO  1 n@Wn(bx)
@xn
(33)
   MO  1 X
k2N;k 6=n
k
@Wk(bx)
@xn
+
MOX
k2N
k
@Wk(bx)
@xn
= 0
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or
X
m2MO
@um(bx)
@xn
   MO  1X
k2N
k
@Wk(bx)
@xn
(34)
+
MOX
k2N
k
@Wk(bx)
@xn
=
X
m2MO
@um(bx)
@xn
+
X
k2N
k
@Wk(bx)
@xn
= 0:
A.2 . Global social welfare and corruption levels
We begin by observing three facts. Firstly, the equilibrium vector (exn)n2N under a ban
is independent of the distribution of the corruption weights. This follows immediately
from the rst order conditions associated with equation (3) and the assumption that all
social groups are organized:
(1 + n)
X
m2Mn
@um(ex)
@xn
= 0 for all n 2 N: (35)
We denote global social welfare under a ban by GSW
 
(exn)n2N. Secondly, the policy
vector that maximizes global social welfare must necessarily satisfy
X
m2M
@um(x)
@xn
= 0 for all n 2 N: (36)
Thirdly, the equilibrium vector (bxn)n2N under foreign lobbying must necessarily satisfy
n(bx; 1)  (1 + 1) X
m2M1
@um(bx)
@xn
+ 2
X
m2M=M1
@um(bx)
@xn
= 0 for all n 2 N; (37)
where M=M1 means the set M excluding the subset M1. We can write global social
welfare under foreign lobbying as GSW
 
(bxn(1))n2N which, we note, is a function of
1 > 0. We want to evaluate
@GSW
 
(bxn(1))n2N
@1
=
X
n2N
 
dbxn
d1
X
m2M
@um(bx)
@xn
!
: (38)
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Starting from equation (37), we can use the implicit function theorem and the assump-
tion that um is additive separable to derive
dbxn
d1
=
 1
jHj
@n
@xn
@n
@1
(39)
where jHj > 0 is the determinant of the Hessian matrix of second order derivatives and
@n
@xn
< 0. These signs are implied by the second order conditions for a maximum. It
follows that sign(dbxn
d1
)=sign(@n
@1
) where @n
@1
=
X
m2M1
@um(bx)
@xn
. By assumption, for m 2M1,
um has a unique maximum for x1, which we may denote x1 . We need to consider a
negative and a positive externality separately. Suppose that the policy choice imposes
a negative externality. Then bx1 < x1 because the foreign lobby groups inuence the
choice of x1 and want it to be lower. This implies that
@1
@1
=
X
m2M1
@um(bx)
@x1
> 0. The
assumption of a negative externality means that @k
@1
=
X
m2M1
@um(bx)
@xk
for k > 1 is negative.
We conclude that dbx1
d1
> 0 and dbxn
d1
< 0 for n > 1. Since
X
m2M
@um(x)
@xn
= 0 at xn
and the utility functions are additive separable, we observe that
X
m2M
@um(x1)
@x1
< 0 andX
m2M
@um(xn)
@xn
< 0 for n > 1 because bx1 > x1 and bxn > xn for n > 1. Using these facts to
evaluate equation (38), we conclude that
@GSW
 
(bxn(1))n2N
@1
< 0: (40)
The case with a positive externality is similar but with the relevant signs reversed. We
know from proposition 2 thatGSW
 
(bxn(1))n2N = GSW  (xn)n2N > GSW  (exn)n2N
for 1 = 1. Since GSW
 
(bxn(1))n2N is strictly decreasing in 1 and continuous while
GSW
 
(exn)n2N is independent of 1, it is possible that a ban is better from a global
social welfare point of view than foreign lobbying for some values of 1. A su¢ cient
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condition is that global social welfare is higher under a ban than if country 1 could
impose its most preferred policy choice on all the other countries (1 !1).
A.3 . The equilibrium characterization with partial bans
The equilibrium characterization in the two subgames with partial bans can be derived
as a special case of Lemma 5 in Aidt and Hwang (2008). The rst order conditions that
govern the equilibrium choices in subgame PB k are
k
@Wk
@xk
+  k
@W k
@xk
+
@uOk
@xk
+
@uO k
@xk
= 0 (41)
k
@Wk
@x k
+  k
@W k
@x k
+
@uO k
@x k
= 0: (42)
Substituting the functional forms, we obtain equations (21) and (22).
A.4 . Comparison of the equilibrium outcome under scenario [T] and [RE]
We can write the di¤erence in social welfare k as
k =  
 
O(   1) + U   2  O(1 + ) + U
22
for k 2 fd; fg : (43)
The two countries are symmetric, so we look for symmetric equilibria in undominated
strategies. In scenario [T], O < 0 and U < 0, so it follows immediately that k < 0
for all values of  > 1 and it is, therefore, a weakly dominant strategy for both countries
to allow foreign lobbying. In scenario [RE], O > 0 and U < 0. Since
 
O(   1) + U   2 =  O(1 + ) + U   2  1 + O ; (44)
it follows that for all  > 0,
 
O(1 + ) + U

< 0 =>
 
O(   1) + U   2 < 0 and
that the no ban policy is a weakly dominant strategy if
O <
 U
1 + 
 O: (45)
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Conversely, for  > 1, it follows that
 
O(   1) + U   2 > 0 =>  O(1 + ) + U >
0 and no ban policy is also a weakly dominant strategy if
O >
2  U
   1 = 
O. (46)
Since for  > 1, 2 
U
 1  

 U
1+

= 2 1+ 
U
( 1)(+1) > 0, it follows that a ban is a weakly
dominant strategy for O 2 O; O. The comparative statics are (for  6= 1)
@O
@
=   
U
(1 + )2
> 0;
@O
@
=
U   2
(   1)2 < 0: (47)
A.5 . Condition for a partial ban being a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome
The welfare di¤erential for country  k is
W PBk k  W FB k =
 
O + U
2
2   2  O + 1  O + U    O  O + 2
22
> 0 (48)
for O < 0, and U < 0 and restriction (17). Condition (30) and the assumption that
O < 0 imply that W PBkk   WNBk > 0. It is therefore a best response for country k
to introduce a partial ban if country  k adopts a no ban policy. Conversely, it is best
response for country  k to do so if country k adopts the partial ban. We need to check
that equation (30) is consistent with the parameter restrictions imposed by equation
(17). Equation (17) demands that O >  1  
1+
U . We can evaluate
 2
U + 2
2 + 1
 

 1  
1 + 
U

=
( + 1) (2   1)  U
( + 1) (2 + 1)
: (49)
A su¢ cient condition for this to be positive is that   1
2
. Thus, for
O 2

 1  
1 + 
U

; 2
U + 2
2 + 1

(50)
it it a best response for one country to introduce a partial ban if the other does not
ban. The constitutional game has multiple equilibria in this case. If O >  2U+2
2+1
, it is
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optimal for both countries to allow foreign lobbying and the unique equilibrium involves
choosing the no ban policy for both countries.
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Notes
1Aidt (2002) shows that social groups may remain unorganized for strategic reasons.
2See also Qiu (2004) or Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
3In the interest of brevity, we do not consider the fourth possibility by which a
country may ban its own lobby group from lobbying abroad while allowing foreign
groups to lobby within its jurisdiction. The case seems less empirical relevant and the
key insights regarding partial bans can be learned from the analysis that we do present.
41
4Since the strategy set of each country got three elements, there are nine subgames
to consider. However, six of these lead to a total ban and are payo¤ equivalent.
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